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NOTE 
THE SWORD AND THE STEEPLE: A HISTORY OF 
CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES AND AN ANALYSIS OF 
FALLS CHURCH V. PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL  
CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES 
M. Steven Osborne† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America has developed into a large, pluralistic 
society. One feature of many pluralistic societies is the reality of multiple 
religions. With each religion comes, to some extent, a polity.1 From time to 
time, the civil law of state and federal governments have had to interact 
with these religious polities. How the civil law corresponds with the 
canonical laws of these religious polities has tremendous import for many 
different areas of the law. 
One particular area where this correspondence is important is the field of 
ecclesiastical property law. Recently, numerous hierarchical churches2 have 
been undergoing divisions over issues of doctrine and practice. Legal 
questions have arisen regarding who owns property claimed both by the 
dissenters and the general church after a formal division has taken place. 
This has led to numerous civil cases in many states. This Note will explore 
one such case from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Falls Church v. 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. This Note will consist of three parts. 
First, it will explain the factual and procedural background to the Falls 
Church case. Second, it will discuss the history of the legal status of 
ecclesiastical property and how courts, both in Europe and the United 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Business Manager, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D. Candidate, 
Liberty University School of Law (2016). The author would like to recognize his parents and 
family for raising him to be the man that he is today. He would like to thank Pastors John 
and Shirley Tasch for preparing and training him to pursue the call of God on his life. Most 
importantly, the author gives all glory to God, without whose purpose there is no virtue and 
without whose anointing there is no means to reach that purpose. 
 1. When the term ‘‘polity’’ is used in this Note, it will be in reference to a politically 
organized unit having a distinct legal identity. 
 2. When this Note refers to hierarchical churches it refers to churches that have 
governing structures built on an episcopal model or a similarly structured system. These 
churches typically have more centralized contral with bishops and a ranking of church 
officials. 
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States, have applied trust law to ecclesiastical property. Finally, this Note 
will discuss what the policy of the courts should be in the future and how 
these suggestions, if applied, would have affected the Falls Church holding. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The conflict that gave rise to Falls Church came from a dispute within the 
Episcopal Church. The church has, in recent years, been torn asunder as 
conflict has arisen between the hierarchy of the Episcopal Church and the 
orthodox Anglican congregations that seek independence.3 The division 
revolves around doctrinal issues, particularly in matters of the church’s 
public witness.4 All congregations and ecclesiastical bodies involved in the 
dispute were originally part of the larger Anglican Communion.5 However, 
the new organization formed by the breakaway congregations are not 
recognized as being a part of the Anglican Communion by the Archbishop 
of Canterbury.6 This communion is organized hierarchically. However, 
unlike the Catholic Church, the Anglican Communion is decentralized and 
power within the American Anglican community largely rests with the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States.7 
In response to what they considered to be an embrace of heretical actions 
by the Protestant Episcopal Church (‘‘the general church’’), numerous 
congregations around the United States broke away from that polity and 
sought to re-associate with a different ecclesiastical body.8 Many of these 
churches, including the Falls Church, associated with an Anglican 
Communion in Nigeria and formed the Convocation of Anglicans in North 
America (‘‘CANA’’) congregations.9 This created a more orthodox polity 
that served as a counterbalance to the general church. 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. Michael Conlon, Episcopal Church dissidents move towards division, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2008, 10:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/04/us-religion-
episcopal-idUSTRE4B30Q320081204. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Resolution 14: Episcopal Authority and Oversight, ANGLICAN COMMUNION (2015), 
http://www.anglicancommunion.org/communion/acc/meetings/acc9/resolutions.cfm. 
 6. See Jennifer Berry Hawes, Archbishop says ACNA not part of the Anglican 
Communion, THE POST AND COURIER (Oct. 9, 2014, 2:52 PM), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20141009/PC16/141009387. 
 7. The Anglican Communion, THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, 
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/anglican-communion (last visited Nov. 3, 2015). 
 8. See Alicia Constant, The Costly Faithfulness of the Falls Church, THE GOSPEL 
COALITION (May 24, 2012), http://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/the-costly-faithfulness-
of-the-falls-church. 
 9. Id. 
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This division did not come without legal consequences. The separated 
churches had to settle the question of who owned the property that the 
break-away congregations used.10 The Falls Church property is located in 
Fairfax County, Virginia, which is one of the highest valued real estate 
markets in the country. The general church claimed that the Falls Church 
and other CANA churches were merely holding the properties in trust for 
the general church; and that now, because a separation had occurred, the 
property should revert back to the general church.11 
Falls Church was one of a string of cases that dealt with issues ranging 
from who the parties were to whether religious documents should be 
considered in ecclesiastical property cases.12 The Falls Church court 
specifically faced the issue of how to apply “neutral principles of the law” to 
a church property dispute.13 The neutral principles of the law doctrine has 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that “there are neutral 
principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be 
applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded.”14 
This issue has generated a great amount of deliberation from courts around 
the country that have had to wrestle with this question. 
Different states have taken different approaches to how they deal with 
the issues associated with Falls Church. Many states have statutory schemes 
that are more conducive to hierarchical churches than others.15 The court of 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. See generally Property Recovery Litigation, EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF VA., 
http://www.thediocese.net/News/Property_Recovery/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
 11. See generally Church Property Dispute, EPISCOPAL CHURCH, 
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/library/topics/church-property-dispute (last visited Oct. 4, 
2015); Mary Schjonberg, State high court won’t reconsider decision against Falls Church Anglican, 
EPISCOPAL CHURCH (June 14, 2013), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/library/ article/state-high-
court-won%E2%80%99t-reconsider-decision-against-falls-church-anglican. 
 12. See Property Recovery Litigation, EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF VA., 
http://www.thediocese.net/News/Property_Recovery/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
 13. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 537 (Va. 
2013). 
 14. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). The Court was operating out of a desire to 
avoid entanglements that would implicate a First Amendment Establishment Clause issue. 
The neutral principles approach has the effect of treating the ecclesiastical body as any other 
corporation, using “neutral” principles of property law. Throughout this Note, the author 
will attempt to convey that this approach, when applied in such a way that it ignores the 
ecclesiastical polity of the church, is antithetical to the freedom and independence of the 
church. 
 15. Compare Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d 530 (discussing Virginia Code § 57-1.1), with 
Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013) (discussing Texas 
corporation law). 
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any state must consider the common and statutory law of that state, the 
United States Constitution, and general principles of law when determining  
the status of these congregations  and, ergo, who is the owner of the 
property. 
In deciding this case, the Virginia Supreme Court considered Virginia 
statutes regarding the corporate status of churches and the common law 
that developed around the application of those statutes.16 Virginia’s anti-
establishmentarian legacy has provided a strong bias in favor of 
congregational churches. However, recent revisions to the Virginia Code 
have opened up space for hierarchical churches to exercise more authority 
in the Commonwealth.17 
The manner in which ecclesiastical property cases are decided will have a 
significant impact in determining questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and 
property. It is imperative that the judicial branch provide the necessary 
guidance in accordance with the rule of law. 
A. Impact of Jones v. Wolf on Jurisprudence 
In Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court explicitly and thoroughly applied 
neutral principles of the law for the first time.18 That case involved a dispute 
between a portion of a Georgia congregation and the general church to 
which that congregation belonged.19 The Court vacated the decision of the 
Georgia Supreme Court, which had been in favor of the majority of the 
break-away congregation against the general church.20 
The Court’s decision in Jones opened the door for state courts to 
minimize the independence of ecclesiastical polities. Even though the 
Establishment Clause functions to protect the independence of the Church, 
the majority opinion in Jones ironically undermined the freedom of the 
Church in the name of preserving establishment clause jurisprudence. 
1. Justice Blackmun’s Majority Opinion 
Justice Blackmun issued the majority opinion, holding that the states 
may exercise the option of using neutral principles of contract and property 
law to determine church property disputes. The Court claimed the rule 
allowed for courts to give deference to the highest decision making body 
                                                                                                                                      
 16. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 537-39. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). 
 19. Id. at 597-98. 
 20. Id. at 610. 
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within a religious polity, provided that courts did not address issues of 
religious doctrine in doing so. 
Blackmun’s opinion reflected the overarching concern that caused the 
court to take up the case in the first place, namely, that the courts would 
employ judgment in regards to doctrine when deciding which faction would 
control the property. The idea was that using secular contract and property 
law would relieve the court of the necessity of considering matters of 
doctrine. The Virginia Supreme Court decision in Falls Church applied the 
neutral principles doctrine in a way that took into account the religious 
documents defining the polity of the church. However, other courts have 
used the opportunity provided for them in the Jones decision to disregard 
the religious documents of the church and apply the default provisions 
provided in state statutes regarding corporations instead. 
By utilizing the neutral principles approach, Justice Blackmun claimed 
the new approach would be ‘‘completely secular in operation, and yet 
flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and 
polity.’’21 He pointed to the fact that the approach would allow lawyers and 
judges to consider issues that were familiar to them.22 The neutral principles 
approach promised to ‘‘free civil courts completely from entanglement in 
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.’’23 
The opinion still allowed for the examination of religious documents 
under some circumstances in considering the intent of the parties.24 
However, the Court still found that approach troublesome.25 While the 
Court acknowledged that states may be in a position where they must 
examine the religious documents, the Court did not require that they 
consider those documents.26 This left open the possibility that courts may 
bypass those documents altogether and simply apply secular property and 
contract law in settling the dispute.27 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. Id. at 603. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (emphasis added). There is reason to seriously doubt the promise of freedom 
from entanglement in questions of polity. Church property disputes are inherently 
intertwined with questions of identity, structure, and authority, all of which are issues of 
polity. 
 24. Id. at 605. 
 25. Id. at 604. The court identified the necessity of using religious documents as a 
‘‘difficulty.’’ This reveals the bias of the Court against the examination of religious documents 
when considering intent. 
 26. Id. at 605. 
 27. See Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2014). 
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The Court disregarded the necessity for deference to the decisions of the 
highest authority within a particular church body.28 Despite its stated 
disdain for courts speaking to issues of polity, the Jones court had no 
problem reaffirming that the default rule for religious governance should be 
majority rule.29 In the name of not legislating church polity, the Court 
legislated church polity. 
The passive-aggressive method of judicial interpretation is a hallmark of 
Justice Blackmun’s jurisprudence. It is very similar to what he did in both 
Roe v. Wade30 and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.31 
In both of those cases, he articulated an opinion that expanded the power of 
the Court over an area of law while simultaneously disclaiming judicial 
power. Whether this method was borne out of a nuanced judicial mind or a 
desire to be purposefully ambiguous to the point of deceit is unknown. 
However, in Jones, like in Roe and Garcia, it merely added to the confusion.  
2. The Principled Dissent in Jones 
Justice Powell took up the task of giving the dissent in Jones.32 The 
dissent did not discount the basic principles of law that would decide such 
cases. Justice Powell stated, “Although the Court appears to accept 
established principles that I have thought would resolve this case, it 
superimposes on these principles a new structure of rules that will make the 
decision of these cases by civil courts more difficult.”33 The “new structure 
of rules” that Powell refered to was Blackmun’s crafty placement of the 
courts between the general church and a congregation through the use of 
secular law. 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605-06. 
 29. Id. at 607-08 (citing Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131 (1872)). 
 30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (“In view of all this, we do not agree that, 
by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are 
at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in 
preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the 
State or a non-resident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has 
still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. 
These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman 
approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’”). 
 31. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51, 554 (1985) (“It is 
no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large 
part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. . . . [Restraints] must be tailored to 
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 
‘sacred province of state autonomy.’”(citation omitted)). 
 32. Jones, 443 U.S. at 610. 
 33. Id. 
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The dissent criticized the majority position, claiming that it allowed for 
the examination of church charters and constitutions only to the extent that 
they contained language indicating that the congregation was holding 
property in trust for the general church.34 It is these documents that provide 
the basis for understanding what the church polity is and how that church 
polity affects the property rights of the parties.35 The majority’s position is 
that courts should examine these religious documents with a strictly and 
purely secular lens.36 The Jones decision allows courts to reinterpret church 
documents by leaving out the portions that do not speak directly to civil 
property and trust law.37 
One of the dissent’s key arguments dealt with the absurdity of trying to 
half-way read a document.38 The dissent pointed out that the courts would 
be denied relevant evidence of how the religious polity is structured if the 
church documents were not read in their context.39 It stated, “The 
constitutional documents of churches tend to be drawn in terms of religious 
precepts. Attempting to read them ‘in purely secular terms’ is more likely to 
promote confusion than understanding.”40 The dissent was correct in its 
prediction that the Jones majority approach to neutral principles was more 
likely to lead to confusion.41 
3. Issue at Stake 
The law respects the sacredness of assent and jurisdiction.42 It is 
important that the courts give due deference to the mutual assent that the 
general church and its individual congregations entered into when they 
bound themselves together in a religious polity. While there are certainly 
First Amendment issues that this Note will touch upon, there is an even 
deeper legal issue relating to the nature of assent and the important role that 
the courts have in upholding the assent of the parties and in recognizing 
religious polities as distinct from other voluntary associations. The majority 
                                                                                                                                      
 34. Id. at 612. 
 35. Below, this Note will discuss the way in which the Jones decision serves to 
undermine the respect for religious polities traditionally found within the law. 
 36. Jones, 443 U.S. at 612. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.   
 40. Id. 
 41. Compare Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530 
(Va. 2013), with Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.594 (Tex. 2014). 
 42. Assent is self-evidently crucial to the law of contracts as well as the Constitutional 
right to freedom of association. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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position places a potent weapon in the hands of those who seek to 
undermine the authority and jurisdiction of the church. 
4. The Broken Promise of Jones 
The Jones Court promised that the need to examine questions of 
religious polity would be obviated entirely through the use of the neutral 
principles approach.43 According to Jones, “The neutral-principles approach 
. . . obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical 
polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes.”44 Yet, the Virginia 
Supreme Court faced a situation where The Falls Church contended “that it 
was not bound by the canons, including the Dennis Canon”45 because 
“there is no evidence of mutual assent by The Falls Church with regard to 
[The Protestant Episcopal Church] and the Diocese having any rights to the 
property.”46 The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that “[a]s this 
argument relates to the nature of the relationship between the parties, we 
will address it here.”47 The Jones Court attempted to create an option that 
would eliminate a situation where, “civil courts would always be required to 
examine the polity and administration of a church to determine which unit 
of government has ultimate control over church property.”48 This analysis 
sought to circumvent the questions of assent and polity, but ultimately it 
posed the threat of bringing decisions that should be made within an 
ecclesiastical body under the authority of the State. 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605. 
 44. Id. 
 45. The Dennis Canon states, 
All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission 
or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the  Diocese  thereof  in  
which  such  Parish,  Mission or Congregation is located. The existence of this 
trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and authority of the Parish, 
Mission or Congregation otherwise existing over such property so long as the 
particular Parish, Mission or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to, 
this Church and its Constitution and Canons. 
Episcopal Archives, http://www.episcopalarchives.org/pdf/CnC/CandC_2009pp11-60.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2015). This quote is found in Cannon 7, Section 4 within the cannon of 
the Episcopal Church. 
 46. Fall Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 540 (Va. 
2013). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605. 
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B. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. 
The Falls Church was founded in 1732 as one of two congregations in the 
Truro parish.49 In 1769, the church was built on the property that the 
Protestant Episcopal Church would later claim as its own.50 The Protestant 
Episcopal Church (“TEC”) was founded in 1789.51 The Falls Church 
petitioned for, and was accepted to, membership in a Diocese of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in 1836.52 
In 2003, a conflict arose within the TEC regarding what many dissident 
members considered to be a break from orthodoxy on the part of the TEC.53 
The congregation of the Falls Church voted overwhelmingly to join with 
other churches in disaffiliating with the TEC on December 17, 2006.54 Six 
other congregations in that Diocese joined with Falls Church, and together 
they became a part of the CANA congregations.55 
After these congregations broke away, they filed petitions pursuant to 
Virginia Code § 57-9(A) to get the deeds to the property recognized as 
being in the name of the CANA congregations.56 The TEC and the Diocese 
responded by filing a complaint, claiming that all personal and real property 
held by the congregations was being held in trust for them.57 They claimed 
to have directed the trustees of the CANA congregations to transfer the 
property back to the general church.58 
The trial court in Falls Church used several factors to conclude that the 
property belonged to the TEC, including: an examination of Virginia 
statutes, the deeds, the constitutions and canons of the church, and the 
course of dealing between the parties.59 
In examining the deeds of the churches,60 the trial court found that the 
first deed from 1746 conveyed the land to “the said Vestry of Truro 
Parish.”61 The second, third, and fourth deeds were made out to “trustees of 
                                                                                                                                      
 49. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 534. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 535. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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the Episcopal Church known and designated as the ‘Falls Church,’” 
“Trustees for the Falls Church Episcopal Church,” and “Trustees of the Falls 
Church.”62 There were also fifth and sixth deeds both conveying property to 
“Trustees of the Falls Church, Falls Church, Virginia.”63 Deeds seven 
through eleven were conveyed to “Trustees of the Falls Church 
(Episcopal).”64 
The trial court in Falls Church concluded that the frequent designation of 
the church as Episcopal in the conveyances was an indication that the trust 
was a unit of the TEC.65 The trial court held that a reasonable grantor would 
have concluded, based upon the circumstances surrounding the 
designations of the Falls Church in the conveyances, that they were 
transferring property to a local Episcopal Church and that the church 
would not be removed from the TEC or the Diocese without their consent.66 
In considering the statutes, the trial court concluded that Virginia Code § 
57-7.1 did not change Virginia’s longstanding rule against courts 
recognizing trusts held for a general church.67 Instead, it concluded that 
Virginia Code § 57-15 prohibited the  the court from transferring the 
property without the transfer being the desired outcome of the hierarchical 
church leadership.68 
The trial court then turned its attention to the constitutions and canons 
of the church.69 The congregation had agreed to adhere to the canons and 
constitutions as well as the doctrine of the Episcopal Church.70 This 
attachment extended beyond spiritual matters to administrative matters 
such as health and pension plans.71 The trial court also noted that the extent 
of the general church’s administrative control also extended specifically 
                                                                                                                                      
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. The trial court stated that “each congregation was bound by the constitution and 
canons of the general church and must acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Bishop; all clergy 
must affirm they ‘conform to the Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship of the Episcopal 
Church’ to be ordained; all congregations use the Book of Common Prayer; . . .” Id. 
 71. Id. (“Bishops must regularly visit parishes to examine the state of the churches; and 
congregations must participate in the Diocesan health care plan, contribute to the Church 
Pension Fund, and purchase fire, casualty and workers’ compensation insurance.”). 
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over the use of the property.72 Particularly, it pointed to the regulations that 
prohibited the congregation from alienating consecrated property without 
permission from the TEC or the Diocese.73 Likewise, it noted that the 
Diocese retained the right to declare the property abandoned if it ceased to 
be used by a congregation of the TEC or the Diocese.74 
When it came to the course of dealing between the parties, the trial court 
looked at several factors.75 It looked at the fact that the congregation had 
joined the general church in accordance with the general church’s rules.76 It 
considered the church’s reputation in the community as an Episcopal 
church.77 Perhaps even more importantly, it considered the fact that the 
congregation sought permission from the Diocese before it encumbered 
property.78 The Falls Church appealed this ruling, and the TEC and Diocese 
cross-appealed in regards to the trial court’s interpretation of Virginia Code 
§ 57-7.1.79 
1. Issue in Falls Church  
The Virginia Supreme Court, using a hybrid approach, partially 
collapsed the distinction between neutral principles of the law doctrine and 
the principle of deference. By stating that the prior existing relationship 
between the general church and the congregation alone was enough to 
establish that the property was being held in trust for the general church,80 
the court opened the door for future courts to create a more flexible 
approach in applying neutral principles.  
The deferential approach articulated in the dissent of Jones v. Wolf would 
direct the civil court focus on “ascertaining, and then following, the 
decision made within the structure of church governance.”81 As a matter of 
fact, the majority in Jones, wanted to “free civil courts completely from 
                                                                                                                                      
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 536. 
 80. Id. at 540 (“As a number of courts in other states have noted, the Dennis Canon 
‘merely codified in explicit terms a trust relationship that has been implicit in the 
relationship between local parishes and dioceses since the founding of [TEC] in 1789.’” 
(citation omitted)).  
 81. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 618 (1979).  
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entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”82 Yet, 
the Virginia Supreme Court, claiming that Virginia Code § 57-7.1 would 
not incorporate the Dennis Canon,83 looked to the polity of the church in 
coming to the conclusion that a trust existed.84 
The holding of the Virginia Supreme Court was a step in the direction of 
a more deferential approach. This direction, if continued or adopted as 
standard by the United States Supreme Court, could allow churches to 
apply their ecclesiastical laws in regards to secular objects, including 
property. 
III. HISTORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 
In order to gain a proper understanding of the issues surrounding the 
legal debate over implied trusts and ecclesiastical polities, it is important to 
understand the history of ecclesiastical property disputes. This article will 
explore the legal history behind church property disputes from before the 
time of Constantine up to the present. Understanding the development of 
the law in this matter should inform the reader’s understanding of implied 
trusts in today’s context.  
A. Antiquity 
Ecclesiastical property disputes are not a new phenomenon.85 The early 
church historian Eusebius recorded a property dispute that occurred when 
a bishop, Paul of Samosata, was accused of teaching heterodox doctrine and 
was removed from the bishopric.86 Upon the removal of Paul, the bishop 
Domnus was appointed to take over the church at Antioch.87 Although he 
had lost the bishopric, Paul refused to relinquish control of the church 
                                                                                                                                      
 82. Id. at 603.  
 83. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 539 (“[A]ny express trusts purportedly created by the 
Dennis Canon were ineffective in Virginia.”). 
 84. Id. at 540 (“In the present case, we need look no further than the Dennis Canon to 
find sufficient evidence of the necessary fiduciary relationship.”). 
 85. EUSEBIUS, THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 248 (G.A. Williamson trans., Penguin Book 
1965). Eusebius’ account of the dispute between the Church and the wayward bishop Paul of 
Samosata is among the earliest accounts of an ecclesiastical property dispute being settled in 
a civil court. Id.  
 86. Id. Eusebius states that Paul of Samosata held “low, degraded opinions about 
Christ.” Id. at 244. This charge sprang from Paul’s regarding “Him as in His nature just an 
ordinary man.” Id. Paul also sustained other charges, including robbing and manipulating 
his church, as well as depriving the injured of their rights. Id. at 246-47.  
 87. Id. at 248.  
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building.88 The bishops appealed the issue to the Emperor Aurelian, who 
rendered a verdict for the bishops, and forced Paul to relinquish control.89  
Such favorable legal treatment towards the church by the Roman 
government was more of an aberration than the norm before the reign of 
Constantine.90 Before the Edict of Milan, Christians were subjected to harsh 
persecution under the Emperor Diocletian.91 
In the years leading up to Diocletian’s reign, churches had become more 
confident in their ability to acquire property and to expand architecturally.92 
Eusebius, who was a contemporary of this particular persecution, records 
that many Christians “[n]o longer satisfied with the old buildings . . . raised 
from the foundations in all the cities churches spacious in plan.”93 The 
Emperor Diocletian, eager to restore the glory of Rome through a renewed 
pagan piety, began a systematic persecution.94 Part of the Diocletian 
persecution involved the seizure of church property. 
The legal status of the church changed with the rise of Constantine to the 
imperial throne.95 After Diocletian’s death, control of the Roman Empire 
was divided between several emperors, among them was Constantine. 
Constantine ended the Diocletian persecution edicts in his portion of the 
empire, and began the process of providing restitution for the losses 
                                                                                                                                      
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. Eusebius’s full account is as follows:  
When Paul had lost both the orthodoxy of his faith and his bishopric, Domnus, 
as already stated, took over the ministry of the Antioch Church. But Paul 
absolutely refused to hand over the church building; so the Emperor Aurelian 
was appealed to, and he gave a perfectly just decision on the course to be 
followed: he ordered the building to be assigned to those to whom the bishops 
of the religion in Italy and Rome addressed a letter. In this way the man in 
question was thrown out of the church in the most ignominious manner by the 
secular authority. 
Id. 
 90. Id. at 249 (“Such was the treatment that we received from Aurelian at that time. But 
as his reign went on, he changed his attitude towards us and was now pressed by some of his 
advisers to instigate a persecution against us . . . .”).  
 91. Peter J. Leithart, The Great Persecution, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 28, 2012),  
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2012/03/great-persecution.  
 92. EUSEBIUS, supra note 85, at 257.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 258. Eusebius describes seeing “places of worship thrown down from top to 
bottom, to the very foundations, the inspired holy Scriptures committed to the flames in the 
middle of public squares . . . .” Id.  
 95. Peter J. Leithart, Constantine and the Ecclesial Polis, FIRST THINGS, (Mar. 10, 2009), 
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2009/03/constantine-and-ecclesial-polis. 
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suffered by the Christians in his region.96 Upon the signing of the Edict of 
Milan, this process was extended to the entire empire.97 
With legal recognition, the position of church property changed 
dramatically. Constantine, and then succeeding emperors, granted the 
church property.98 Constantine engaged in an extravagant building program 
that constructed church buildings on the sites of landmark events in 
Christianity.99 Constantine gave churches in Rome rent collected from 
various landed estates,100 estimated at “more than four hundred pounds of 
gold per year,”101 as well as large amounts of property.102 These large gifts 
would “la[y] the foundations for the church’s enduring wealth in later 
centuries.”103 
Even with the fall of the Roman Empire, Christianity in what used to be 
the Western Roman Empire and beyond continued to maintain property. 
Particularly, Christian missions were conducted among barbarian tribes, 
through use of monasteries maintained by the Benedictine monks. As 
antiquity came to a close and what we know as the Middle Ages dawned, 
the church was in a good position financially.104 
B. Medieval 
By the medieval period, the church had stupendous property holdings. 
“[I]t is said to have owned between one-fourth and one-third of the land of 
western Europe.”105 The church attained this land not only through gifts 
and taxes as mentioned above, but also through “agricultural, 
manufacturing, and commercial enterprises” maintained by the church 
through those properties.106 The medieval period also resulted in the 
                                                                                                                                      
 96. RODNEY STARK, THE TRIUMPH OF CHRISTIANITY 171 (2011). 
 97. Constantine Christian History, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Aug. 8, 2008, 12:56 PM), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ch/131christians/rulers/constantine.html. 
 98. STARK, supra note 96, at 174.  
 99. Id. at 173-74. Constantine’s building projects included churches on the sites of Jesus’ 
tomb, the Mount of Olives, and the Nativity in Bethlehem. Id. 
 100. Id. at 174 
 101. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 102. Id. (“Constantine donated ‘an extraordinary amount of property’ to the church. 
Thus, ‘massive grants of land and property were made . . . [and an] avalanche of precious 
metals.’”).  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 237 (1983). 
 106. Id.  
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development of church canon law. These canons would speak to many 
issues, including issues of ecclesiastical property.107 
Secular law’s influence on canon property law surpasses its influence on 
other areas of canon law.108 The church did not view property as having a 
sacramental character, thus secular law influenced canon property law more 
significantly than any other area of canon law.109 The church saw property 
as a resource within the church’s temporal power.110 
Due to the feudal context of the medieval period, “ecclesiastical property 
rights were often closely interconnected with secular property rights.”111 
The parish112 would often hold the land of a bishopric113 or abbey114 and 
exercise feudal powers over that property.115 There were even times when a 
bishopric might hold the same land as a baron.116  
The interconnectedness created a dualistic approach to property law in 
regards to ecclesiastical property.117 When a dispute arose over the ground 
rent owed by the parish to the bishopric or abbey, it would usually be settled 
in ecclesiastical courts according to canon law.118 “[D]isputes over feudal 
dues and services owed by the bishopric or abbey to the baron would 
normally be within the jurisdiction of secular courts and would be settled by 
secular law[.]”119 The church, in the exercise of its property rights, operated 
both within and outside of the feudal and urban economic orders.120  
Although it was tied to secular law, canon law did not cede all property 
considerations to secular law.121 There were actually ecclesiastical 
considerations and certain underlying canon law principles that continued 
                                                                                                                                      
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. (“[T]he canon law of property was influenced by contemporary secular law to a 
much greater extent than was the canon law of family relations.”).  
 109. Id. (“[I]t was never suggested that property—even ecclesiastical property—had a 
sacramental character.”).  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. A parish is a jurisdictional unit of the church. Id. 
 113. A bishopric is land under the authority of a particular local bishop. Id. 
 114. An abbey is property related to the monastic orders. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 237-38. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 238. It should be noted that even in that context, “jurisdiction . . . might be a 
matter of contest between the ecclesiastical and the secular courts.” Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
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to inform the medieval church’s property law jurisprudence.122 As a matter 
of fact, there were several contributions that carried over into secular law 
and continue to impact property law as a whole today.123  
1. Impact of the Papal Revolution  
To gain a complete understanding of the ecclesiastical position in regards 
to property, it is necessary to understand the development of ecclesiastical 
polity in relation to the state. Any proper understanding of this is not 
complete without an examination of the effect of the Papal Revolution. 
While modern scholars, often operating on a biased understanding of 
progress and history, have a hard time seeing anything “traditional” or 
“religious” as being revolutionary, it would be a great mistake to not see the 
monumental effect that the Papal Revolution had on Western Europe.  
The Papal Revolution of Gregory VII is considered Europe’s first “total 
revolution.”124 The Papal Revolution sparked over what is called the 
“investiture controversy,” essentially a struggle between the king and the 
pope over who would have the power to appoint bishops.125 This also raised 
the issue of who would elect the pope.126 A fundamental struggle ensued 
between Gregory VII and the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV.127 In the 
course of the revolution, the doctrine of the two swords came to 
prominence.128 This doctrine asserted that the church was supreme both in 
spiritual and temporal affairs.129  
                                                                                                                                      
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. Harold Berman chronicles the impact of canon law rules on many subjects, 
including property law, it was used in the development of English common law. See generally 
id.  
 124. Peter J. Leithart, Papal Revolution, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 15, 2007), 
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2007/02/papal-revolution. 
 125. Robert Louis Wilken, Gregory VII and the Politics of the Spirit, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 
1999), http://www.firstthings.com/article/1999/01/003-gregory-vii-andthe-politics-of-the-
spirit.  
 126. Leithart, supra note 124.  
 127. The term fundamental is used here because the conflict struck at the very heart of 
what the Church was as a polity in relation to the state.  
 128. Leithart, supra note 124. 
 129.  See Doctrine of the Two Swords, OXFORD REFERENCE, http://www.oxfordreference.com/ 
view/10.1093/acref/9780198662624.001.0001/acref-9780198662624-e-5802 (last visited Oct. 4, 
2015); Resource Center, Dictionary: Two Swords, CATHOLIC CULTURE, 
https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=36967 (last visited Oct. 
4, 2015) (“We are taught by the words of the Gospel that in this Church and under her control 
there are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal . . . both of these . . . the [spiritual] and the 
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The Papal Revolution created a dualism within the political world, 
contending that there were two sovereign powers.130 Some have suggested 
that this dualism “created European freedom.”131 Dualism gave voice to the 
idea of a new sovereign, which was “realized [in the form of] ‘the idea of a 
trans-local organization, a corporation.’”132  
“Freedom of the church” was a rallying cry born out of the Papal 
Revolution.133 The Magna Carta, one of the cornerstone documents of 
English liberty, states, “the English Church shall be free, and shall have its 
rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired.”134 That clause of the 
Magna Carta goes on to specifically protect the rights of the English Church 
to elect their own officials, free from the interference of the king.135 This 
clause reflected an intent on the part of Bishop Stephen Langton, as well as 
the nobility, that the king not be allowed to interfere with the polity of the 
church.  
Enjoying a newfound independence in the wake of the Papal Revolution, 
the church conducted itself in the manner of a trans-local corporation.136 
Under the canon law system, the constitutional structure of the church was 
expressed in the terms of corporation law.137 Importantly, this included the 
                                                                                                                                      
temporal swords, are under the control of the Church. The first is wielded by the Church; the 
second is wielded on behalf of the church.” (quoting Pope Boniface VIII)).  
 130. Leithart, supra note 124. 
 131. Id. (internal quotations omitted). European freedom can be said to have been 
created by the carving out of free space in civil society. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. MAGNA CARTA, cl. 1., http://legacy.forham.edu/halsall/source/ magnacarta.asp (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2015). The Magna Carta delineates the rights of the English Church as 
follows:  
First, that we have granted to God, and by this present charter have confirmed 
for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and 
shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired. That we wish 
this so to be observed, appears from the fact that of our own free will, before the 
outbreak of the present dispute between us and our barons, we granted and 
confirmed by charter the freedom of the Church’s elections - a right reckoned 
to be of the greatest necessity and importance to it - and caused this to be 
confirmed by Pope Innocent III. This freedom we shall observe ourselves, and 
desire to be observed in good faith by our heirs in perpetuity. 
Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Leithart, supra note 124. This was evidenced by the fact that the English Catholic 
Church was using confirmation from Pope Innocent III to assert its claims of independence 
from the crown.  
 137. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 225. 
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law of corporate jurisdiction over “particular classes of persons and 
particular types of subject matter.”138  
In terms of property law, ecclesiastical corporations owned ecclesiastical 
property.139 Because property was owned by the corporation, it was 
“committed to the purposes of the corporation.”140 This tied the property to 
a particular purpose.141 Some examples of how ecclesiastical corporations 
would find their expression include monastic houses, hospitals, universities, 
dioceses, and even the papacy itself.142  
2. Ecclesiastical Corporation Officers as Trustees 
The officers of these ecclesiastical corporations acted as trustees for the 
property owned by the ecclesiastical corporation in their charge.143 As 
trustees, they had a legal duty under canon law to use the property for the 
benefit of those for whom the property was acquired.144 This means that if 
the property were set aside for use as a hospital, then the officers of the 
hospital would be responsible for ensuring that the property was used for 
that purpose.145 Interestingly, the secular English concept of trust that is 
considered in this Note, finds its origin in the canon law designation of 
property on the basis of its “use.”146 
While the trustee was technically considered the owner of the property, 
he was bound by law to administer the property for its intended use.147 
Originally, this rule was within the jurisdiction of canon law, but in 
England, through the progress of time, it eventually expanded to fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Chancellor’s court.148  
                                                                                                                                      
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 239. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. This will prove to be of significance when one considers the general direction 
that the law of implied trusts is trying to take ecclesiastical property ownership.  
 142. Id. 
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 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
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the ‘use,’ which was known and used throughout Europe from the twelfth century on, and 
which was developed in England in the chancellor’s court in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries.”).  
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The three parties to a trust, and to the medieval “use,” were first, a donor, 
now known as a settlor, defined as one who has placed the property in trust 
for someone else, second, the donee, and third, the beneficiary.149 The 
ecclesiastical corporation had the distinction of being both the donee and 
the beneficiary.150 When one would donate a gift to the church, and the 
ecclesiastical corporation’s officers would exercise the right to possess, the 
right to transfer, or the right to use the property, the only condition was 
that they had to do so in accordance with their duties as trustees.151 Another 
concept used by the medieval canonists was that of a “corporation of 
goods.”152 This concept has not been explicitly carried over into modern 
English law but does find expression in the civil law systems of the 
continent.153 The corporation of goods personifies the purpose for which 
the property is to be used.154 Under this arrangement, the corporation 
would consist not only of persons, but also of whatever good the 
ecclesiastical organization was created to achieve, strongly tying the use of 
the property to the purposes of the corporation.155 
C. Reformation and Establishment of Religion 
With the division of Christendom and the end of the medieval era, new 
realities emerged. More specifically, for English and American law, the 
establishment of the Church of England under Henry VIII marked the 
beginning of a shift in the relation of civil authority to ecclesiastical 
property.156 Under Henry, the Church of England declared itself 
independent of papal authority, claiming continuity with the pre-separation 
church, but asserting new leadership.  
The headship of the Church of England shifted from the pope to the 
king.157 This change in headship resulted in the creation of new institutions 
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 150. Id.  
 151. Id. This is still the rule in English and American corporate law. Id.  
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 154. Id. at 239-40. 
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 156. See Church History, THE ANGLICAN DOMAIN, http://www.anglican.org/church/ 
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and procedures to address appeals.158 It also resulted in changes in the 
power of the church in relation to the crown. The English Reformation 
changed the context of the exercise of governmental power.159 Before the 
reformation, the church and crown had operated with legal systems that 
were theoretically separate from one another, however, even before Henry 
initiated the break with Rome, this was beginning to change.160  
At the end of the 15th century, and increasingly until Henry came to 
power, the church courts came under the supervision of the crown’s legal 
apparatus.161 While the church and state were technically independent of 
one another, time and circumstances had bound all of English society, 
including the church, together in a more unified state.162 With increasing 
regularity, disputes that would normally be settled within ecclesiastical 
courts made their way into the king’s court.163 Certain inconspicuous 
litigation would “regularly appl[y] common rules of property, obligations, 
and wrongs to the affairs of the institutional church and to relationships 
within the parish about religious subject matter.”164  
When Henry became the head of the Church of England, it meant he 
became the head of the church court system in England.165 While he allowed 
the church courts to survive, their context was changed.166 Rather than 
being viewed as the English arm of a foreign entity, the church courts in 
England came to be viewed as an instrument under the control of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 158. Id. While there were some new procedures instituted, the basic structure and 
administrative procedures within English ecclesiastical courts remained the same. Id.  
 159. ROBERT C. PALMER, SELLING THE CHURCH: THE ENGLISH PARISH IN LAW, COMMERCE, 
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 161. Id. at 237. 
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 165. Id. at 237. 
 166. Id.  
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king.167 This meant that there were new grounds for testing the relationship 
between these church courts and the king’s court.168  
Henry used the form of continuity to mask the changes occurring in both 
jurisdiction and law.169 Under the new arrangement, property rights 
changed and governmental power centralized.170 One result of this change 
was the dissolution of religious houses.171 Religious houses had made 
extensive use of the trustee-style “uses” concept.172 Specifically, religious 
houses had been operating as beneficiaries in England since the fourteenth 
century.173 Because the use system had required the property to be directed 
for such a purpose as benefits the beneficiary, this created a moral dilemma 
for what to do with the property belonging to monasteries and religious 
houses.174 Henry eliminated this problem by giving the monasteries the legal 
ownership interest instead of a merely beneficial interest.175 As a practical 
matter, this move represented a localization of control. As mentioned 
earlier, under the medieval system, the church was both the donee and 
beneficiary.176 The possibility of external influence and control was 
somewhat dissipated by localizing the control and giving legal interest to 
the monastery. A statute passed in 1531 limited parish endowments by use 
to twenty years.177  
To create a framework for the new arrangement, Henry devised a statute 
of uses.178 This statute expanded from the previous bill of primer seisen, 
which treated the beneficiary “as if he were” seised.179 Under the statute the 
beneficiary was in seisin.180 The significance of this shift is that these rights 
were no longer flowing as a matter of canon law jurisprudence, but rather 
through the statutes of a king. While the church enjoyed a non-adversarial 
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relationship in which it could depend on the state for patronage, it also 
became more vulnerable to the state.181 
D. Rise of Rationalism and Disestablishmentarianism 
After the Church of England became the established church of the state, 
dissent grew against the church holding this status. It was not that the 
critics were charging the church with being corrupt, but the critics viewed 
the church as being too hierarchical and too large, a “vast property-owning 
organization.”182 Many Separatist and Puritan movements viewed this as 
antithetical to New Testament principles.183  
Traditionally, theorists viewed the established church as a public service, 
provided by the government similar to transportation or protection.184 
However, in his 1736 work entitled, Alliance between Church and State, 
Bishop William Warburton suggested that churches exist apart from the 
state, and that the established church is merely the particular church that is 
chosen by the state to be established.185 By the mid-nineteenth century, this 
was the mainstream view.186 It is also the view of the American states that 
broke away from Britain and formed the United States.187 This is evident by 
the First Amendment jurisprudence that cautions against giving a particular 
church the preeminent place of being “established.”188 Soon, not only in the 
former American colonies, but in other areas of the then-current British 
Empire, the Church was being disestablished.189 
When the church became disestablished, the courts began to apply the 
same legal standards to the Church of England, or what had now become 
known as the Episcopal Church, as was applied to the dissenting churches 
under common law.190 There were three principles that formed the 
jurisprudence towards the dissenting churches.191 First, the court would not 
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intervene unless there was a justiciable issue.192 Usually a justiciable issue 
would include issues such as property, but specific religious ministrations 
would not be decided by the court.193 Second, a trust for a religious body 
was treated in the same way any other charitable trust would be treated.194 
The court considered the trust instrument in making this determination.195 
So if a trust instrument stipulated that property was to be used for the 
purposes of a particular denomination, then the court would enforce that 
aspect of the instrument.196 Likewise, if the instrument stipulated that the 
trustees submit to the authorities within a denomination, the court would 
enforce that stipulation.197 Third, the individual members of a congregation 
impliedly agreed to abide by the rules of the denomination by participating 
in its affairs.198 
In addition to the three principles, the British Judicial Committee added 
a fourth principle regarding churches that were once established and now, 
due to geographic and political changes were no longer established.199 If the 
church had once had its affairs regulated by law, then its members and the 
trustees of its property would be considered to have agreed to those rules.200 
This Note has considered these principles because, even though the 
Episcopal Church is not established in any American state, the legal 
principles that lead to the establishment of an implied trust are applicable 
here.  
E. The Modern Era and Recent History 
Today it is common among legal scholars to view religious polity in 
terms of voluntary associations as opposed to ecclesiastical bodies existing 
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as unique entities.201 Some legal scholars, many of whom make exclusivist 
claims to modernity, assume from the outset that religious bodies are 
completely on par and that they are the product of human choice as 
opposed to divine purpose.202 Inherent with this view of the law is the 
assumption that courts and administrative agencies must always make 
decisions regarding religious polities within a civil legal framework.203 
During the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a gradual move 
away from the trust doctrines related to purpose that had been present in 
previous centuries. 
Under English common law, a system of implied trusts had been 
developed as a method for addressing intra-church property disputes.204 
Part of this implied trust system involved an examination of the doctrine of 
the church by the court, whereby the court determined whether one of the 
parties had diverted from the original doctrine of the church.205 This 
method was treated unfavorably in some lower American courts.206  
A string of United States Supreme Court decisions, beginning with 
Watson v. Jones, gradually chipped away at the common law maxim that the 
court could tie the use of church property to doctrinal purpose.207 The 
Watson Court disapproved the departure-from-doctrine element.208 The 
Court “rejected the English doctrine of implied trust by deferring to the 
decisions of church judicatory bodies.”209 It made the caveat that when the 
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church had a congregational or independent societal form of government, 
then the laws normally governing voluntary associations would be used.210 
Because Watson involved only dicta against the departure-from-doctrine 
element, numerous state courts continued to follow the common law 
maxim.211 Due to the possible need for religious bodies to change doctrines 
over time, these courts modified the departure-from-doctrine element.212 It 
would require a “substantial” departure from doctrine before the court 
would intervene against the deviating party.213 Some lamented the fact that 
this forced courts to touch the question of doctrine and to consider how 
important that particular doctrine was to the overall theology and practice 
of the church.214 
Nearly a century later, the Court held in Presbyterian Church in the 
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church that the 
use of the departure-from-doctrine element was unconstitutional.215 The 
Court did not eliminate the possibility of using implied trusts, but stated 
that only civil law principles may be considered in determining which party 
will prevail.216 While the Hull Court discussed the use of neutral property 
and trust law principles, it affirmed the principle of deferring to the highest 
authority within a hierarchical religious polity.217 The Court then sustained 
the permissibility of using neutral principles with its decision in Jones v. 
Wolf. Currently, each state has the choice of applying either neutral 
principles or deference, with some states applying a hybrid approach.218 
                                                                                                                                      
 210. Id. This raises a constitutional question as to whether congregational bodies may be 
treated differently under the law as are hierarchical religious bodies.  
 211. Hansen, supra note 204, at 287.  
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at 287-88. 
 215. Id. at 288.  
 216. Id. at 288 (“[T]here are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property 
disputes, which can be applied without “establishing” churches to which property is awarded 
. . . [T]he Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes 
without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious 
organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as 
not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.” (quoting Presbyterian 
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969))).  
 217. Id. at 289 (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America 
and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). 
 218. Id. at 291 (“Since Hull and Jones, state court decisions have tended to divide into 
three theoretical positions, two of which are roughly analogous to the strict deference and 
strict neutral principles positions of the Supreme Court. The third approach purports to 
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IV. FUTURE JUDICIAL POLICY AND THE FALLS CHURCH DECISION 
A. How the Virginia Supreme Court Applied Neutral Principles 
Historically, Virginia has disdained denominational trusts for 
property.219 Hierarchical churches were prohibited from relying on 
denominational trusts whether those trusts were expressed or implied.220 As 
a matter of fact, when the Dennis Canon was enacted into the canons of the 
Episcopal Church in 1979, the existing Virginia Code provision forbade 
holding property in trust for a hierarchical church.221 Under Virginia Code 
§ 57-7, the exercise of property rights were restricted to the congregational 
level of ecclesiastical governance.222 It specifically made an allowance for the 
conveyance, devising, and dedication of land for “the use and benefit of any 
religious congregation.”223  
The General Assembly changed its approach in 1993 when it amended 
the Virginia Code to allow for hierarchical churches to hold property in 
trust.224 Under Virginia Code § 57-7.1, property could be conveyed or held 
in trust by any “church, church diocese, religious congregation or religious 
society.”225 This meant that hierarchical churches could have congregations 
hold the property in trust for the larger congregational bodies. Regarding 
the change, Professor A.E. Dick Howard stated, “The General Assembly has 
acted to sweep away that anachronistic and unconstitutional provision. In 
enacting § 57–7.1, the legislature did what needed to be done.”226  
There is some question as to whether the General Assembly had the right 
to restrict the property rights of hierarchical churches in the first place. 
                                                                                                                                      
follow neutral principles, but invariably interprets the documents examined as imposing 
either an express or implied trust in favor of the church hierarchy on the disputed 
property.”); 
see also Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).  
 219. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 537 (Va. 
2013). “The General Assembly has not . . . validate[d] trusts for a general hierarchical church 
and such trusts would be invalid.” Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 201 S.E.2d 752, 758 (Va. 
1974).  
 220. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 537.  
 221. Id. at 539. 
 222. Id. at 538.  
 223. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (repealed 1993). 
 224. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (West 2005). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 545 (McClanahan, J., concurring).  
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Justice McClanahan addressed that point in her concurrence.227 It was her 
opinion that the majority wrongly assumed that the Dennis Canon was void 
because Virginia Code § 57-7 rendered it so.228 In her opinion, the First 
Amendment prohibited former Code § 57-7, rendering it void in regards to 
its effect on the Dennis Canon passed in 1979.229 The Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment places a bar on government entities establishing 
any one religion.230 This would also prevent the Commonwealth from 
treating one religious entity with more favor than another. 
The majority did not agree with the constitutional argument and held 
that the express trust created by the Dennis Canon was not valid under 
Virginia law.231 Even though an express trust would have been valid before 
the Virginia legislature enacted Code § 57-7, the statute as it existed served 
to invalidate the trust.232 Therefore, the court stated that the Falls Church 
property was not being held in an express trust for the Episcopal Church.233  
B. Hybrid Approach 
While the Virginia Supreme Court used the language of “neutral 
principles” it was actually applying a hybrid approach.234 The hybrid 
approach is identifiable based upon its use of the implied trust.235 Patty 
Gerstenblith makes the point that the courts employing the hybrid 
approach, “[w]hile employing the language of neutral principles and 
examining church documents and state statutes . . . are nonetheless 
applying a concept that is entirely unique to church-related cases.”236 
Neutral principles involve making use of the property and contract law 
                                                                                                                                      
 227. Id.  
 228. Id.  
 229. Id. at 545.  
 230. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 231. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 539. 
 232. Id. “[U]nless the language shows a contrary intent, the language of an inter vivos 
trust should be construed according to the law in effect at the time the trust is executed.” 
McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Va. 2004). 
 233. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 539 (“Thus, any express trusts purportedly created by the 
Dennis Canon were ineffective in Virginia.”). 
 234. Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes among Religious 
Organizations, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 335 (James A. Serritella et al. eds. 2006).  
 235. Id. (“[T]hose courts that apply the ‘hybrid’ approach to resolve church property 
disputes, although claiming to adopt neutral principles, actually use the implied trust 
theory.”). 
 236. Id.  
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already available and at the disposal of the judges.237 This is one of the key 
reasons that Justice Blackmun gave in Jones for applying the neutral 
principles approach.238 For those who advocate use of the neutral principles 
approach exclusively, anything outside of these secular principles is not 
truly a neutral principles approach.239  
C. Implied Trust 
There are two circumstances when an implied trust is applied.240 The first 
is a resulting trust that arises when “circumstances indicate that the settlor 
did not intend the titleholder to take the entire interest in the property.”241 
The other type of implied trust is a constructive trust, which is used as a 
matter of equity.242 In Falls Church, the Virginia Supreme Court employed a 
constructive trust.243  
As noted above, the court applied a constructive trust because the 
express trust set forth in the Dennis Canon was created before the Virginia 
General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to allow for hierarchical 
corporations to have property held for the general church in trust.244 
Because there was a lack of statutory authority for the court to draw upon, it 
had to employ a constructive trust to achieve an equitable result.245  
The implied trust can be traced back to a time when religious 
organizations were not recognized as corporations, a situation that still 
exists in Virginia, and were prevented from owning property in their own 
right.246 Instead, property conveyance would be made to the individual 
minister or priest.247 This system was an early antecedent to the corporation 
sole.248 There were other circumstances where the trust held by the religious 
                                                                                                                                      
 237. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).  
 238. Id.  
 239. Gerstenblith, supra note 234, at 335.  
 240. Id. at 331.  
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 331-332  
 243. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 540 (Va. 
2013). 
 244. Id. at 539.   
 245. Id. at 539-540.  
 246. Gerstenblith, supra note 234, at 333.   
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. A corporation sole is a corporation consisting of one person.   
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leader was considered held for the benefit of the church or entire 
denomination.249  
D. Implied Trust and the Connection to Departure-From-Doctrine Theory 
Critics of the implied trust theory compare it to the departure-from-
doctrine theory that the Supreme Court disapproved in Watson, and 
declared unconstitutional in Hull.250 While critics acknowledge that the 
doctrine element is no longer considered, they maintain that the deference 
to the hierarchy that results from the implied trust is similar.251 Although 
the modern implied trust approach does not include an analysis of doctrine, 
it does defer to the hierarchy of the religious polity.252 This creates a 
situation where “the hierarchy remains the beneficiary of the implied trust, 
regardless of any doctrinal changes, and the faction loyal to the hierarchy 
retains control of the local entity and its property.”253  The assumption is 
that the local entity has impliedly agreed to follow the regulations of the 
national organization.254 An examination of the relationship will determine 
whether the local entity has agreed to the rules that the national 
organization has set forth.255 In Falls Church, the court considered the 
relationship between the Falls Church and the main Protestant Episcopal 
Church.256 It considered the fact that Falls Church had received visiting 
bishops from the general church, as well as the fact that Falls Church had 
sought permission from the Diocese before encumbering property in the 
past.257 It is clear, then, that the Virginia Supreme Court followed the 
implied trust method of examining the relationship between the parties. 
                                                                                                                                      
 249. Id.  
 250. Id. at 334 
 251. Id. at 334 (“Without the requirement of loyalty to the original religious doctrine . . . 
the hierarchy remains the beneficiary of the implied trust . . . .”). 
 252. Id.  
 253. Id.  
 254. Id.  
 255. See id.  
 256. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 540-41 (Va. 
2013).  
 257. Id. at 535.  
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V. DIRECTION THAT THE COURTS SHOULD TAKE 
A. Resurrect the Departure-from-Doctrine Principle  
While the continued use of the implied trust doctrine is a good step, the 
courts should follow through with the original intent of the implied trust 
doctrine and reinstate the common law departure-from-doctrine principle. 
There are two reasons why the Supreme Court should consider establishing 
new precedent in this matter. First, the goal of an implied trust, historically, 
has been to preserve the property for a particular purpose. If property 
cannot be tied to purpose, then the need for an implied trust is greatly 
diminished or eliminated. Second, there is no need for the court to redefine 
the purpose for a particular piece of property. If property is to be held in 
trust for a particular doctrinal or religious purpose and the court is unable 
to even mention or consider that religious doctrine, then the court must 
either arbitrarily declare the property to not be held in trust, or it must 
arbitrarily change the purpose for holding the property. 
The historical purpose of the implied trust doctrine is tied to retaining 
the doctrinal loyalty of whatever party is in control of the encumbered 
parcel. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania perhaps stated the issue best 
when it held that “[t]he guarantee of religious freedom has nothing to do 
with the property. It does not guarantee freedom to steal churches.”258 The 
court went on to explain how the religious freedom element in question was 
the freedom of the dissenting congregation to leave and establish a new 
church on new property.259 There was not a freedom, however, to use 
property that had been granted in the form of a trust for another purpose or 
in pursuit of another doctrine than was intended in that trust.260 This was 
the American view adopted from England where property was still tied to 
doctrinal adherence as per the common law.261 The departure-from-
doctrine element was only slightly modified to distinguish between 
fundamental and immaterial deviations.262 It was not until later in 
American jurisprudence that the Supreme Court and other courts 
decoupled doctrine from purpose and, in effect, forbade the use of implied 
                                                                                                                                      
 258. Justin M. Gardner, Ecclesiastical Divorce in Hierarchical Denominations and the 
Resulting Custody Battle over Church Property: How the Supreme Court Has Needlessly 
Rendered Church Property Trusts Ineffectual, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 235, 249-50 (2007). 
 259. Id. at 250.  
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at 249 (“The implied trust doctrine, with its corollary departure-from-doctrine 
test, became the accepted practice of England . . . .”).  
 262. Id.  
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trusts to secure doctrinal ends.263 While the Court has decoupled a 
departure-from-doctrine element from the implied trust doctrine, their 
reasons for doing so are not entirely sound. The Watson Court and 
subsequent courts assumed that the judiciary is forbidden from considering 
religious doctrine.  This, however, is not entirely true. 
This raises the second point. It is unnecessary and improper for courts to 
redefine the purposes for which an implied trust exists. There are other 
instances where courts have recognized and given application to a certain 
holding on the basis of religious doctrine.264 Recently, in United States v. 
Meyers, Mitchell Meyers claimed that he was the founder and reverend of 
the Church of Marijuana and that he had a religious command to use, grow, 
possess, and distribute marijuana.265 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed Meyers’ conviction on the basis that his beliefs were not sufficient 
to constitute religious belief.266 It examined whether the “religion” made 
metaphysical claims and maintained rituals and a belief system.267 The court 
was able to use a determination regarding religious doctrine in coming to 
its conclusion. An inability to do this would have led to the court simply 
having to take Mr. Meyers’ word that he was the founder of a new religion.  
There is a difference between applying preexisting religious doctrines or 
laws that the parties have bound themselves to and making 
pronouncements regarding what that religious law or doctrine is.268 It 
would not be a violation of the First Amendment for the courts to 
acknowledge the factual existence of the religious doctrines of a 
denomination and to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the 
congregation or general church has deviated from that doctrinal standard. 
                                                                                                                                      
 263. The first time the U.S. Supreme Court took up a church property issue in Watson v. 
Jones, it did not employ the older English common law departure from doctrine principle. 
The Court noted that there was no express trust tying the property to the propagation of any 
special religious dogma, only an understanding that the property was to remain with 
whatever body could legitimately claim to be the congregation. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 
726-27 (1871).  
 264. Gardner, supra note 258, at 258. 
 265. Id. at 260.  
 266. Id.  
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. at 261. One example used to explain this is that the courts cannot tell the Roman 
Catholic Church who the Pope should be; however, it can acknowledge that there is a Pope. 
The first is a normative determination; the second is a factual determination. Id. 
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Even after Watson, various state courts did not have a problem making 
these factual determinations.269 
If the departure-from-doctrine element were restored, the outcome of 
Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. may have been 
different. The question would have been whether the Virginia Supreme 
Court believed that the general church’s move from standard Christian 
orthodoxy on various matters constituted a fundamental departure. One of 
the issues being debated is the nature of marriage. Because issues such as 
marriage are so fundamental to the church’s self-understanding,270 the 
Court would likely find a departure by either the individual congregation or 
the general church on this matter to be a fundamental departure.  
B. Deference to Religious Polities is Currently the Best Option 
In the alternative, due to the precedent set in Hull, the best option for 
courts to pursue is deference to the decisions of religious polities. The 
Virginia Supreme Court recognized that without the departure-from-
doctrine element, the application of an implied trust would tie the purpose 
of the property to use for the benefit of the general church. Congregations 
are by their nature temporary. The congregation that existed in the Falls 
Church of 1828 is not the same congregation that exists there today. The 
congregation has considered itself, throughout its history, to be a 
constituent part of the Episcopal Church. The Episcopal Church continues 
to exist as a corporate body and therefore, the implied trust must be 
understood in deference to the highest authority within the religious polity.  
The application of a deference model would have produced the same 
result here as in Falls Church. Because the Virginia Supreme Court 
employed a hybrid approach,271 it applied an implied trust, which arrived at 
the same result as would a strict deference model. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In a pluralistic society it is important that the religious customs and 
practices of various groups be given the freedom to operate, provided they 
do so within the boundaries of the law. It is legitimate for religious polities 
                                                                                                                                      
 269. Gerstenblith, supra note 234, at 334. The departure-from-doctrine element was 
disapproved in Watson v. Jones but was not held unconstitutional until the Hull decision. Id.   
 270. Marriage is a sacrament of the Episcopal Church. THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, WHAT 
WE BELIEVE, The Sacraments, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/sacraments (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2014).   
 271. See supra Part IV(B).  
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to create rules for how their material possessions are held and used. The 
court’s role is to ensure that the corporate constitutions and contractual 
understandings that exist between the factions of these religious polities be 
enforced.  
Some legal scholars, who are more than happy to see contracts regarding 
business matters performed, suddenly become squeamish when presented 
with enforcing the terms of a religious polity. Perhaps it is that they are not 
knowledgeable enough in the history or traditions of the common law to 
feel comfortable making such decisions. It could be that they are worried 
that any legal recognition of religious polity or rules will be a violation of 
the First Amendment. A more sinister possibility is that some of them want 
to see religious polities receive limited or no recognition at all, due to a 
desire to further push religion out of public life. Whatever the reason may 
be, courts would do well to consider the historical and legal ramifications of 
undermining religious polities. If religious polities are important to the 
functioning of a pluralistic society, then this issue is perhaps of paramount 
importance to the ability of our society to operate in cohesion.  
  
